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Abstract. The paper addresses the problem of emulating a regular register in a
synchronous distributed system where clients invoking read() and write() oper-
ations are anonymous while server processes maintaining the state of the register
may be compromised by rational adversaries (i.e., a server might behave as ratio-
nal malicious Byzantine process). We first model our problem as a Bayesian game
between a client and a rational malicious server where the equilibrium depends
on the decisions of the malicious server (behave correctly and not be detected by
clients vs returning a wrong register value to clients with the risk of being de-
tected and then excluded by the computation). We prove such equilibrium exists
and finally we design a protocol implementing the regular register that forces the
rational malicious server to behave correctly.
Keywords: Regular Register, Rational Malicious Processes, Anonymity, Bayesian
Game.
1 Introduction
To ensure high service availability, storage services are usually realized by replicat-
ing data at multiple locations and maintaining such data consistent. Thus, replicated
servers represent today an attractive target for attackers that may try to compromise
replicas correctness for different purposes, such as gaining access to protected data, in-
terfering with the service provisioning (e.g. by delaying operations or by compromising
the integrity of the service), reducing service availability with the final aim to damage
the service provider (reducing its reputation or letting it pay for the violation of service
level agreements), etc. A compromised replica is usually modeled trough an arbitrary
failure (i.e. a Byzantine failure) that is made transparent to clients by employing Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance (BFT) techniques. Common approaches to BFT are based on the
deployment of a sufficiently large number of replicas to tolerate an estimated number
f of compromised servers (i.e. BFT replication). However, this approach has a strong
limitation: a smart adversary may be able to compromise more than f replicas in long
executions and may get access to the entire system when the attack is sufficiently long.
To overcome this issue, Sousa et al. designed the proactive-reactive recovery mecha-
nism [22]. The basic idea is to periodically reconfigure the set of replicas to rejuvenate
servers that may be under attack (proactive mode) and/or when a failure is detected
(reactive mode).
This approach is effective in long executions but requires a fine tuning of the repli-
cation parameters (upper bound f on the number of possible compromised replicas in
a given period, rejuvenation window, time required by the state transfer, etc...) and the
presence of secure components in the system. In addition, it is extremely costly during
good periods (i.e. periods of normal execution) as a high number of replicas must be
deployed independently from their real need. In other words, the system pays the cost
of an attack even if the attack never takes place.
In this paper, we want to investigate the possibility to implement a distributed shared
variable (i.e. a register) without making any assumption on the knowledge of the num-
ber of possible compromised replicas, i.e. without relating the total number of replicas
n to the number of possible compromised ones f . To overcome the impossibility re-
sult of [5,19], we assume that (i) clients preserve their privacy and do not disclose their
identifiers while interacting with server replicas (i.e. anonymous clients) and (ii) at least
one server is always alive and never compromised by the attacker. We first model our
protocol as a game between two parties, a client and a rational malicious server (i.e.
a server controlled by rational adversaries) where each rational malicious server gets
benefit by two conflicting goals: (i) it wants to have continuous access to the current
value of the register and, (ii) it wants to compromise the validity of the register return-
ing a fake value to a client. However, if the rational malicious server tries to accomplish
goal (ii) it could be detected by a client and it could be excluded from the computa-
tion, precluding it to achieve its first goal. We prove that, under some constraints, an
equilibrium exists for such game. In addition, we design some distributed protocols im-
plementing the register and reaching such equilibrium when rational malicious servers
privilege goal (i) with respect to goal (ii). As a consequence, rational malicious servers
return correct values to clients to avoid to be detected by clients and excluded by the
computation and the register implementation is proved to be correct.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related works,
Section 3 and Section 4 introduce respectively the system model and the problem state-
ment. In Section 5 we model the problem as a Bayesian game and in Section 6 we pro-
vide a protocol matching the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium that works under some limited
constraints, while in Section 7 we presents two variants of the protocol that relax the
constraints , at the expense of some additional communications between the clients or
protocol complexity increase. Finally, Section 8 presents a discussion and future work.
2 Related Work
Building a distributed storage able to resist arbitrary failures (i.e. Byzantine) is a widely
investigated research topic. The Byzantine failure model captures the most general type
of failure as no assumption is made on the behavior of faulty processes. Traditional so-
lutions to build a Byzantine tolerant storage service can be divided into two categories:
replicated state machines [20] and Byzantine quorum systems [5,17,18,19]. Both the
approaches are based on the idea that the state of the storage is replicated among pro-
cesses and the main difference is in the number of replicas involved simultaneously in
the state maintenance protocol. Replicated state machines approach requires that every
non-faulty replica receives every request and processes requests in the same order be-
fore returning to the client [20] (i.e. it assumes that processes are able to totally order
requests and execute them according to such order). Given the upper bound on the num-
ber of failures f , the replicated state machine approach requires only 2f +1 replicas in
order to provide a correct register implementation. Otherwise, Byzantine quorum sys-
tems need just a sub-set of the replicas (i.e. quorum) to be involved simultaneously. The
basic idea is that each operation is executed by a quorum and any two quorums must
intersect (i.e. members of the quorum intersection act as witnesses for the correct execu-
tion of both the operations). Given the number of failures f , the quorum-based approach
requires at least 3f+1 replicas in order to provide a correct register implementation in a
fully asynchronous system [19]. Let us note that, in both the approaches, the knowledge
of the upper bound on faulty servers f is required to provide deterministic correctness
guarantees. In this paper, we follow an orthogonal approach. We are going to consider
a particular case of byzantine failures and we study the cost, in terms of number of hon-
est servers, of building a distributed storage (i.e. a register) when clients are anonymous
and have no information about the number of faulty servers (i.e. they do not know the
bound f ). In particular, the byzantine processes here considered deviate from the pro-
tocol by following a strategy that brings them to optimize their own benefits (i.e., they
are rational) and such strategy has the final aim to compromise the correctness of the
storage (i.e., they are malicious). In [16], the authors presented Depot, a cloud storage
system able to tolerate any number of Byzantine clients or servers, at the cost of a weak
consistency semantics called Fork-Join-Causal consistency (i.e., a weak form of causal
consistency).
Another different solution can rely on Proactive Secret Sharing [26]. Secret Sharing
[27] guarantees that a secret shared by a client among n parties (servers) cannot be ob-
tained by an adversary corrupting no more than f servers. Moreover, if no more than f
servers are Byzantines, the client can correctly recover the secret from the shares pro-
vided by any f + 1 servers. Recent Proactive Secret Sharing protocols, e.g. [28], show
that Secret Sharing can be applied also to synchronous networks. Even if Proactive Se-
cret Sharing can guarantee the privacy of the data (this is out of the scope of the paper)
against up to f = n − 2 passive adversaries, the solution has some limitations. First
fo all, clients are not able to verify whether the number of Byzantines exceeds f and
hence understand if the message obtained is correct. Secondly, Secret Sharing protocols
operating in a synchronous distributed system with Byzantines (active adversaries) cor-
rectly work with a small number of Byzantines and have high complexity (f < n/2−1
and O(n4) in [28]).
In [3], the authors introduced the BAR (Byzantine, Altruistic, Rational) model to rep-
resent distributed systems with heterogeneous entities like peer-to-peer networks. This
model allows to distinguish between Byzantine processes (arbitrarily deviating from
the protocol, without any known strategy), altruistic processes (honestly following the
protocol) and rational processes (may decide to follow or not the protocol, according
to their individual utility). Under the BAR model, several problems have been investi-
gated (e.g. reliable broadcast [7], data stream gossip [14], backup service through state
machine replication [3]). Let us note that in the BAR model the utility of a process is
measured through the cost sustained to run the protocol. In particular, each step of the
algorithm (especially sending messages) has a cost and the objective of any rational
process is to minimize its global cost. As a consequence, rational selfish processes de-
viate from the protocol just by skipping to send messages, if not properly encouraged
by some reward. In contrast with the BAR model, in this paper we consider malicious
rational servers that can deviate from the protocol with different objectives, benefiting
from preventing the correct protocol execution rather than from saving messages.
More recently, classical one-shot problems as leader election [1,2], renaming and
consensus [2] have been studied under the assumption of rational agents (or rational
processes). The authors provide algorithms implementing such basic building blocks,
both for synchronous and asynchronous networks, under the so called solution prefer-
ence assumption i.e., agents gain if the algorithm succeeds in its execution while they
have zero profit if the algorithm fails. As a consequence, processes will not deviate from
the algorithm if such deviation interferes with its correctness. Conversely, the model of
rational malicious processes considered in this paper removes implicitly this assump-
tion as they are governed by adversaries that get benefit when the algorithm fails while
in [1,2] rational processes get benefit from the correct termination of the protocol (i.e.
they are selfish according with the BAR model).
Finally, the model considered here can be seen as a particular case of BAR where
rational servers take malicious actions, with the application similar to the one consid-
ered in [3]. However, in contrast to [3], we do not assume any trusted third party to
identify users, we assume that clients are anonymous (e.g., they are connected through
the Tor anonymous network [23]), and we investigate the impact of this assumption to-
gether with the rational model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that
analyzes how the anonymity can help in managing rational malicious behaviors.
3 System Model
The distributed system is composed by a set of n servers implementing a distributed
shared memory abstraction and by an arbitrary large but finite set of clients C. Servers
are fully identified (i.e. they have associated a unique identifier s1, s2 . . . sn) while
clients are anonymous, i.e. they share the same identifier.
Communication model and timing assumptions. Processes can communicate only by
exchanging messages through reliable communication primitives, i.e. messages are not
created, duplicated or dropped. The system is synchronous in the following sense: all
the communication primitives used to exchange messages guarantee a timely delivery
property. In particular, we assume that clients communicate with servers trough a timely
reliable broadcast primitive (i.e., there exists an integer δ, known by clients, such that if
a client broadcasts a message m at time t and a server si delivers m, then all the servers
sj deliver m by time t + δ). Servers-client and client-client communications are done
through “point-to-point” anonymous timely channels (a particular case of the commu-
nication model presented in [10] for the most general case of homonyms). Considering
that clients are identified by the same identifier `, when a process sends a point-to-point
message m to an identifier `, all the clients will deliver m. More formally, there exists
an integer δ′ ≤ δ, known by processes, such that if si sends a message m to a client
identified by an identifier ` at time t, then all the clients identified by ` receive m by
time t+ δ′ (for simplicity in the paper we assume δ = δ′).
We assume that channels are authenticated (“oral” model), i.e. when a process iden-
tified by j receives a message m from a process identified by i, then pj knows that m
has been generated by a process having identifier i.
Failure model. Servers are partitioned into two disjoint sub-sets: honest servers and
malicious servers (attackers). Honest servers behave according to the protocol executed
in the distributed system (discussed in Section 6) while malicious servers represent
entities compromised by an adversary that may deviate from the protocol by dropping
messages (omission failures), changing the content of a message, creating spurious mes-
sages, exchanging information outside the protocol, etc. Malicious servers are rational,
i.e. they deviate from the protocol by following a strategy that aims at increasing their
own benefit (usually performing actions that may prevent the correct execution of the
protocol). We assume that rational malicious servers act independently, i.e. they do not
form a coalition and each of them acts for its individual gain.
Servers may also fail by crashing and we identify as alive the set of non crashed
servers3. However, we assume that at least one honest alive server always exists in the
distributed system.
4 Regular Registers
A register is a shared variable accessed by a set of processes, i.e. clients, through two
operations, namely read() and write(). Informally, the write() operation updates the
value stored in the shared variable while the read() obtains the value contained in the
variable (i.e. the last written value). Every operation issued on a register is, generally,
not instantaneous and it can be characterized by two events occurring at its boundary: an
invocation event and a reply event. These events occur at two time instants (invocation
time and reply time) according to the fictional global time.
An operation op is complete if both the invocation event and the reply event occur
(i.e. the process executing the operation does not crash between the invocation and the
reply). Contrary, an operation op is said to be failed if it is invoked by a process that
crashes before the reply event occurs. According to these time instants, it is possible to
state when two operations are concurrent with respect to the real time execution. For
ease of presentation we assume the existence of a fictional global clock and the invoca-
tion time and response time of operations are defined with respect to this fictional clock.
Given two operations op and op′, and their invocation event and reply event times
(tB(op) and tB(op′)) and return times (tE(op) and tE(op′)), we say that op precedes
op′ (op ≺ op′) iff tE(op) < tB(op′). If op does not precede op′ and op′ does not pre-
cede op, then op and op′ are concurrent (op||op′). Given a write(v) operation, the value
v is said to be written when the operation is complete.
In case of concurrency while accessing the shared variable, the meaning of last
written value becomes ambiguous. Depending on the semantics of the operations, three
types of register have been defined by Lamport [15]: safe, regular and atomic. In this
paper, we consider a regular register which is specified as follows:
3 Alive servers may be both honest or malicious.
– Termination: If an alive client invokes an operation, it eventually returns from that
operation.
– Validity: A read operation returns the last value written before its invocation, or a
value written by a write operation concurrent with it.
Interestingly, safe, regular and atomic registers have the same computational power.
This means that it is possible to implement a multi-writer/multi-reader atomic register
from single-writer/single-reader safe registers. There are several papers in the literature
discussing such transformations (e.g., [6,12,21,24,25] to cite a few). In this paper, we
assume that the register is single writer in the sense that no two write() operations may
be executed concurrently. However, any client in the system may issue a write() oper-
ation. This is not a limiting assumption as clients may use an access token to serialize
their writes4. We will discuss in Section 8 how this assumption can be relaxed.
5 Modeling the Register protocol as a Game
In a distributed system where clients are completely disjoint from servers, it is pos-
sible to abstract any register protocol as a sequence of requests made by clients (e.g.
a request to get the value or a request to update the value) and responses (or replies)
provided by servers, plus some local computation. If all servers are honest, clients will
always receive the expected replies and all replies will always provide the right informa-
tion needed by the client to correctly terminate the protocol. Otherwise, a compromised
server can, according to its strategy, omit to send a reply or can provide bad information
to prevent the client from terminating correctly. In this case, in order to guarantee a cor-
rect execution, the client tries to detect such misbehavior, react and punish the server.
Thus, a distributed protocol implementing a register in presence of rational malicious
servers can be modeled as a two-party game between a client and each of the servers
maintaining a copy of the register: the client wants to correctly access the register while
the server wants to prevent the correct execution of a read() without being punished.
Players. The two players are respectively the client and the server. Each player can play
with a different role: servers can be divided into honest servers and malicious servers
while clients can be divided in those asking a risky request (i.e., clients able to detect
misbehaviors and punish server5) and those asking for a risk-less request (i.e., clients
unable to punish servers).
Strategies. Players’ strategies are represented by all the possible actions that a process
may take. Clients have just one strategy, identified by R, that is request information to
servers. Contrarily, servers have different strategies depending on their failure state:
– malicious servers have three possible strategies: (i)A, i.e. attack the client by send-
ing back wrong information (it can reply with a wrong value, with a wrong times-
tamp or both), (ii)NA, i.e. not attack the client behaving according to the protocol
and (iii) S, i.e. be silent omitting the answer to client’s requests;
4 Let us recall that we are in a synchronous system and the mutual exclusion problem can be
easily solved also in presence of failures.
5 Notice that the client ability to detect a server misbehaviors depends on the specific protocol.
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1− θ
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Fig. 1. Extensive form of the game. Dashed line represents the unknown nature of requests from
the risk point of view. Outcome pairs refer to client and server gains respectively.
– honest servers have just the NA strategy.
Let us note that the game between a honest client and a honest server is trivial as
they have just one strategy that is to follow the protocol. Thus, in the following we
are going to skip this case and we will consider only the game between a client and a
rational malicious server.
Utility functions and extensive form of the game. Clients and servers have opposite
utility functions. In particular:
– every client increases its utility when it is able to read a correct value from the
register and it wants to maximize the number of successful read() operations;
– every server increases its utility when it succeeds to prevent the client from reading
a correct value, while it loses when it is detected by the client and it is punished.
In the following, we will denote as Gc the gain obtained by the client when it suc-
ceeds in reading, Gs the gain obtained by the server when it succeeds in preventing
the client from reading and as Dc the gain of the client when detecting the server and
as Ds the loss of the server when it is detected. Such parameters are characteristic of
every server and describe its behavior in terms of subjective gains/losses they are able
to tolerate. Without loss of generality, we assume thatGc,Gs,Dc andDs are all greater
than 0, that all the servers have the same Gs and Ds6 and that all the clients have the
same Gc and Dc. Fig. 1 shows the extensive form of the game.
The game we are considering is a Bayesian game [11] as servers do not have knowl-
edge about the client role but they can estimate the probability of receiving a risky
request or a risk-less request i.e., they have a belief about the client role.
We denote as θ (with θ ∈ [0, 1]) the server belief of receiving a risky request (i.e.
the client may detect that the server is misbehaving) and with 1 − θ the server belief
of receiving a risk-less request (i.e. the client is not be able to detect that the server is
misbehaving).
Analysis of the Bayesian Game. In the following, we are going to analyze the exis-
tence (if any) of a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium i.e., a Nash Equilibrium7 computed by
considering the players’ belief.
Let us note that in our game, clients have just one strategy. Thus, the existence of the
6 Let us note that if two servers have different values for Gs and Ds, the analysis shown in the
following is simply repeated for each server.
7 Let us recall that a Nash Equilibrium exists when each player selects a strategy and none of
the players increases its utility by changing strategy.
equilibrium depends only on the decisions taken by servers according to their utility
parameters Gs, Ds and their belief about the nature of a request (i.e., its evaluation of
θ).
Let us now compute the expected gain E() of a server si while selecting strategies
S, NA and A:
E(S) = (−Ds × (1− θ)) + (−Ds × θ) = −Ds (1)
E(NA) = ((1− θ)× 0) + (θ × 0) = 0 (2)
E(A) = ((1− θ)×Gs)− (θ ×Ds) (3)
Lemma 1. The strategy S is a dominated strategy.
It follows that servers have no gain in playing S , whatever the other player does (cf.
Lemma 1). In fact, there would be no increment of their utility by playing S and then
we will not consider such strategy anymore.
Let us note that a server si would prefer to play NA (i.e., to behave honestly) with
respect to A (i.e., to deviate from the protocol) when E(NA) > E(A). Combining
equations (3) and (2) we have that a si would prefer to play NA when
Gs
(Gs +Ds)
> θ. (4)
The parameters Gs and Ds are strictly dependent on the attackers profile (i.e., an
attacker for which is more important to stay in the system rather than subvert it or vice
versa), thus we can not directly work on them. In the remaining part of the work we
propose protocols to tune the θ parameter in such a way that the inequality (4) holds.
To this purpose, we derive the following Lemmas:
Lemma 2. Let si be a rational malicious server. If Ds < Gs and θ < 12 then the best
response of si is to play strategy A (i.e. NA is a dominated strategy).
Lemma 3. Let si be a rational malicious server. If Ds > Gs and θ ≥ 12 then the best
response of si is to never play strategy A (i.e. NA is a dominant strategy).
Due to the lack of space, proofs of the previous Lemmas can be found in [9].
6 A Protocol P for a Regular Register whenDs  Gs
In this section, we propose a protocol P implementing a regular register in a syn-
chronous distributed system with anonymous clients and up to n− 1 malicious rational
servers. The protocol works under the assumption that the server loss Ds in case of
detection is much higher than its gain Gs obtained when the client fails during a read
(i.e. Ds  Gs8). This assumption models a situation where the attacker is much more
8 More precisely, P works when Ds > cGs where c is the estimated number of clients in the
system.
interested in having access to data stored in the register and occasionally interfere with
the server rather than causing a reduction of the availability (e.g., no termination or va-
lidity violation). We will relax this assumption to the simple case Ds > Gs in the next
section extending P in two different ways.
Our protocol P follows the classical quorum-based approach. When a client wants
to write, it sends the new value together with its timestamp to servers and waits for
acknowledgments. Similarly, when it wants to read, it asks for values and corresponding
timestamps and then it tries to select a value among the received ones. Let us note that,
due to the absence of knowledge on the upper bound of malicious processes, it could
be impossible for a reader to select a value among those reported by servers and, in
addition, the reader may be unable to distinguish well behaving servers from malicious
ones. To overcome this issue we leverage on the following observation: the last client
cw writing a value v is able to recognize such value while reading after its write (as long
as no other updates have been performed). This makes the writer cw the only one able to
understand which server si is reporting a wrong value vi 6= v, detect it as malicious and
punish it by excluding si from the computation. Thus, the basic idea behind the protocol
is to exploit the synchrony of the system and the anonymity of clients to makes the
writer indistinguishable from readers and “force” malicious servers to behave correctly.
Let us note that anonymity itself is not enough to make the writer indistinguishable
from other clients. In fact, if we consider a naive solution where we add anonymity to
a register implementation (e.g., to the one given by Attiya, Bar-Noy and Dolev [4]), we
have that servers may exploit the synchrony of the channels to estimate when the end of
the write operation occurs and to infer whether a read request may arrive from the writer
or from a different client (e.g., when it is received too close to a write request and before
the expected end of the write). To this aim, we added in the write() operation imple-
mentation some dummy read requests. These messages are actually needed to generate
message patterns that make impossible to servers to distinguish messages coming from
the writer from messages arriving from a different client. As a consequence, received a
read request, a server si is not able to distinguish if such request is risky (i.e. it comes
from the writer) or is risk-less (i.e. it comes from a generic client).
In addition, we added a detection procedure that is executed both during read() and
write() operations by any client. In particular, such procedure checks that every server
answered to a request and that the reported information are “coherent” with its knowl-
edge (e.g., timestamps are not too old or too new). The detection is done first locally, by
exploiting the information that clients collect during the protocol execution, and then,
when a client detects a server sj , it disseminates its detection so that the malicious
server is permanently removed from the computation (collaborative detection).
Finally, the timestamp used to label a new written value is updated by leveraging
acknowledgments sent by servers at the end of the preceding write() operation. In par-
ticular, during each write() operation, servers must acknowledge the write of the value
by sending back the corresponding timestamp. This is done on the anonymous chan-
nels that deliver such message to all the clients that will update their local timestamp
accordingly. As a consequence, any rational server is inhibited from deviating from the
protocol, unless it accepts the high risk to be detected as faulty and removed from the
system.
Init:
(01) replies← ∅;my last val← ⊥;my last ts← 0; last ts← 0;
(02) ack ← ∅; honest← {s1, s2 . . . sn}; writing ← false;
———————————————————————————————–
operation read():
(03) if (last ts = 0)
(04) then return⊥;
(05) else replies← ∅;
(06) broadcast READ();
(07) wait (2δ);
(08) if (∀ si ∈ honest, ∃ < −, ts, val > ∈ replies)
(09) then broadcast READACK();
(10) return val;
(11) else wait (δ);
(12) if (∀ si ∈ honest, ∃ < −, ts, val > ∈ replies)
(13) then broadcast READACK();
(14) return val;
(15) else execute detection(repliesi, R)
(16) broadcast READACK();
(17) if (∀ si ∈ honest, ∃ < −, ts, val > ∈ replies)
(18) then return val;
(19) else abort ;
(20) endif
(21) endif
(22) endif
(23) endif
————————————————————————————————
when REPLY(< j, ts, v, ots, ov >) is delivered:
(24) replies← replies ∪ {< j, ts, v >};
(25) replies← replies ∪ {< j, ots, ov >};
————————————————————————————————
when DETECTED(sj) is delivered:
(26) honest← honest \ {sj};
(a) Client Protocol
Init:
(01) vali ← ∅; tsi ← 0;
(02) old vali ← ⊥; old tsi ← 0; readingi ← 0;
————————————————————————————————
when READ() is delivered:
(03) readingi ← readingi + 1;
(04) send REPLY (< i, tsi, vali, old tsi, old vali >);
————————————————————————————————
when READACK() is delivered:
(05) readingi ← readingi − 1;
(b) Server Protocol
Fig. 2. The read() protocol for a synchronous system.
In the following, we provide a detailed description of the protocol P shown in Fig-
ures 2-4.
The read() operation (Fig. 2). When a client wants to read, it first checks if the last ts
variable is still equal to 0. If so, then there is no write() operation terminated before
the invocation of the read() and the client returns the default value ⊥ (line 04, Fig.
2(a)). Otherwise, ci queries the servers to get the last value of the register by sending a
READ()message (line 06, Fig. 2(a)) and remains waiting for 2δ times, i.e. the maximum
round trip message delay (line 07, Fig. 2(a)).
When a server si delivers a READ() message, the readingi counter is increased by one
and then si sends a REPLY(< i, tsi, vali, old tsi, old vali >) message containing the
current and old values and timestamp stored locally (lines 03 - 04, Fig. 2(b)).
When the reading client delivers a REPLY(< j, ts, val, ots, ov >) message, it stores
locally the reply in two tuples containing respectively the current and the old triples
with server id, timestamp and corresponding value (lines 24 - 25, Fig. 2(a)). When
the reader client is unblocked from the wait statement, it checks if there exists a pair
< ts, val > in the replies set that has been reported by all servers it believes honest
(line 08, Fig. 2(a)) and, in this case, it sends a READ ACK() message (line 09, Fig. 2(a))
and it returns the corresponding value (line 10, Fig. 2(a)). Received the READ ACK()
message, a server si just decreases by one its readingi counter (line 05, Fig. 2(b)).
Otherwise, a write() operation may be in progress. To check if it is the case, the client
keeps waiting for other δ time units and then checks again if a good value exists (lines 11
- 12, Fig. 2(a)). If, after this period, the value is not yet found, it means that some of the
servers behaved maliciously. Therefore, the client executes the detection() procedure
to understand who is misbehaving (cfr. Fig. 4). Let us note that such procedure cleans
up the set of honest servers when they are detected to be malicious. Therefore, after the
execution of the procedure, the reader checks for the last time if a good value exists in
its replies set and, if so, it returns such value (line 18, Fig. 2(a)); otherwise the special
value abort is returned (line 19, Fig. 2(a)). In any case, a READ ACK() is sent to block
the forwarding of new values at the server side (line 16, Fig. 2(a)).
The write() operation (Fig. 3). When a client wants to write, it first sets its writing
flag to true, stores locally the value and the corresponding timestamp, obtained incre-
menting by one the current timestamp stored in last ts variable (lines 01 - 02, Fig.
3(a)), sends a WRITE() message to servers, containing the value to be written and the
corresponding timestamp (line 03, Fig. 3(a)), and remains waiting for δ time units.
When a server si delivers a WRITE(v, ts) message, it checks if the received timestamp
is greater than the one stored in the tsi variable. If so, si updates its local variables
keeping the current value and timestamp as old and storing the received ones as cur-
rent (lines 02 - 05, Fig. 3(b)). Contrarily, si checks if the timestamp is the same stored
locally in tsi. If this happens, it just adds the new value to the set vali (line 06, Fig.
3(b)). In any case, si sends back an ACK() message with the received timestamp (lines
08, Fig. 3(b)) and forwards the new value if some read() operation is in progress (lines
09, Fig. 3(b)). Delivering an ACK() message, the writer client checks if the timestamp
is greater equal than its my last ts and, if so, it adds a tuple < j, ts,− > to its ack set
(line 16, Fig. 3(a)).
When the writer is unblocked from the wait statement, it sends a READ() message,
waits for δ time units and sends another READ() message (lines 06 - 08, Fig. 3(a)). This
message has two main objectives: (i) create a message pattern that makes impossible
to malicious servers to distinguish a real reader from the writer and (ii) collect values
to detect misbehaving servers. In this way, a rational malicious server, that aims at re-
maining in the system, is inhibited from misbehaving as it could be detected from the
writer and removed from the computation. The writer, in fact, executes the detection()
procedure both on the ack set and on the replies set collected during the write() (lines
09 - 11, Fig. 3(a)). Finally, the writer sends two READ ACK() messages to block the
forwarding of replies, resets its writing flag to false and returns from the operation
operation write(v):
(01) writing ← true; ack ← ∅;
(02) my last ts← last ts+ 1;my last val← v;
(03) broadcast WRITE(< my last val,my last ts >);
(04) wait(δ);
(05) replies← ∅;
(06) broadcast READ();
(07) wait(δ);
(08) broadcast READ();
(09) execute detection(ack,A);
(10) wait(δ);
(11) execute detection(repliesi, R);
(12) broadcast READACK();
(13) broadcast READACK();
(14) writing ← false;
(15) return(ok).
————————————————————————————————————————-
when WRITE ACK(ts, sj) is delivered:
(16) if (ts ≥ my last ts) then ack ← ack ∪ {< j, ts,− >} endif
————————————————————————————————————————-
when ∃ ts such that S = {j|∃ < j, ts′,− >∈ ack} ∧ S ⊇ honest:
(17) if (ts ≥ last ts) then last ts← ts endif
(18) for each< j, ts′,− > ∈ ack such that ts′ = ts do ack ← ack\ < j, ts′,− > endFor.
(a) Client Protocol
when WRITE(< val, ts >) is delivered:
(01) if (ts > tsi)
(02) then old tsi ← tsi;
(03) old vali ← vali;
(04) tsi ← ts;
(05) vali ← {val};
(06) else if (tsi = ts) then vali ← vali ∪ {val}; endif
(07) endIf
(08) send WRITE ACK(ts, i);
(09) if (readingi > 0) then send REPLY (< i, tsi, vali, old tsi, old vali >) endif.
(b) Server Protocol
Fig. 3. write() protocol for a synchronous system.
(lines 12 - 15, Fig. 3(a)).
Let us note that, the execution of a write() operation triggers the update of the last ts
variable at any client. This happens when in the ack set there exists a timestamp re-
ported by any honest server (lines 17 - 18, Fig. 3(a)).
The detection() procedure (Fig 4). This procedure is used by clients to detect servers
misbehaviors during the execution of read() and write() operations. It takes as parame-
ter a set (that can be the replies set or the ack set) and a flag that identifies the type of
the set (i.e. A for ack, R for replies). In both cases, the client checks if it has received
at least one message from any server it saw honest and detects as faulty all the servers
omitting a message (lines 01 - 08).
If the set to be checked is a set of ACK() messages, the client (writer) just checks if
some server sj acknowledged a timestamp that is different from the one it is using in
the current write() and, if so, sj is detected as malicious (lines 38 - 42). Otherwise, if
the set is the replies set (flagged as R), the client checks if it is running the procedure
while it is writing or reading (line 10). If the client is writing, it just updated the state
procedure detection(replies set, set type):
(01) S = {j|∃ < j,−,− >∈ replies set};
(02) if (honest 6⊆ S)
(03) then for each sj ∈ (honesti \ S) do
(04) trigger detect(sj);
(05) honesti ← honesti \ {sj};
(06) broadcast DETECTED(sj);
(07) endFor
(08) endif
(09) if (set type = R)
(10) then if (writing)
(11) thenR = {j|∃ < j,my last val,my last ts >∈ replies set};
(12) if (honest 6⊆ R)
(13) then for each sj ∈ (honesti \ R) do
(14) trigger detect(sj);
(15) honesti ← honesti \ {sj};
(16) broadcast DETECTED(sj);
(17) endFor
(18) endIf
(19) else for each< j, ts,− >∈ replies set such that ts < last ts− 1 do
(20) trigger detect(sj);
(21) honest← honest \ {sj};
(22) broadcast DETECTED(sj);
(23) endFor
(24) for each< j, ts, val >∈ replies set such that ts = my last ts do
(25) Di = {v | (∃ < j, ts, val >∈ replies set) ∧ (ts = my last ts)};
(26) if ((my last val 6= ⊥) ∧ (my last ts = last ts) ∧ (last val /∈ Di))
(27) then trigger detect(sj);
(28) honest← honest \ {sj};
(29) broadcast DETECTED(sj);
(30) endif
(31) endFor
(32) for each< j, ts, val >∈ replies set such that ts > last ts+ 1 do
(33) trigger detect(sj);
(34) honesti ← honesti \ {sj};
(35) broadcast DETECTED(sj);
(36) endFor
(37) endif
(38) else for each< j, ts,− >∈ replies set such that ts 6= my last ts do
(39) trigger detect(sj);
(40) honest← honest \ {sj};
(41) broadcast DETECTED(sj);
(42) endFor
(43) endif.
Fig. 4. detection() function invoked by an anonymous client for a synchronous system.
of the register. Thus, the writer checks that all servers sent back the pair < v, ts >
corresponding to the one stored locally in the variables my last val and my last ts.
If someone reported a bad value or timestamp, it is detected as misbehaving (lines 11 -
18). If the client is reading, it is able to detect servers sending back timestamps that are
too old (lines 19 - 23) or too new to be correct (lines 32 - 36) or servers sending back
the right timestamp but with a wrong value (lines 24 - 31).
Due to the lack of space, the correctness proofs of P are reported in [9].
7 Pcv and Phash Protocols for a Regular Register whenDs ≥ Gs
In the following, we show how to modify the protocol to get θ ≥ 12 , when Ds ≥ Gs.
In particular, we propose two possible extensions: the first using a probabilistic collab-
orative detection at the client side (introducing a cost in terms of number of messages
needed to run the detection) and the second using a kind of fingerprint to prevent servers
misbehavior (introducing a computational cost).
A collaborative detection protocol Pcv . The collaborative detection involves all the
clients in the detection process and exploits the fact that the last writer remains in the
system and it is always able to identify a faulty server. The basic idea is to look for a
write witness (i.e., the writer) each time that a reader is not able to decide about the
correctness of a value. This solution allows to identify malicious server and to decide
and return always a correct value. However, considering that (i) we want to decouple as
much as possible servers and client, (ii) this collaborative approach has a cost in terms
of messages and (iii) to force rational servers to behave correctly it is sufficient to get
θ ≥ 12 (according to Lemma 3), then we use this collaborative approach only with a
given probability.
More in details, in Pcv protocol, when a reader does not collect the same value from
all servers it flips a coin to decide if running the collaborative detection or not. If the
outcome is 1, then it broadcasts to all the other clients the timestamps collected during
the read operation and waits that some writer acknowledge them. When a client receives
a check timestamp request, it checks if it corresponds to its last written value and if so,
it replies with such a value so that the reader can double-check information provided
by servers. If there is no match between values and timestamps, then clients are able to
detect a faulty server and exclude it from the computation.
The introduction of this probabilistic step in the protocol increases the value of θ to 12 .
As a consequence, following Lemma 3, any rational server will decide to behave cor-
rectly to avoid to be detected.
A fingerprint-based detection protocol Phash. Let us recall that the basic idea behind
the detection process is to include inside reply messages (i.e., write acknowledgements
or read replies) “enough” information to verify the correctness of the provided informa-
tion. In particular, in protocol P , servers are required to acknowledge write operations
by sending back the corresponding timestamp so that each client is always aware about
it and the writer is able to verify that no bad timestamps are sent to clients.
In protocol Phash, the basic idea is to extend P by including another information
i.e., a fingerprint of the value and its timestamp (e.g., its hash), in the write message and
in its acknowledgement so that it is always possible for a client to check that servers
are replying correctly. More in details, when a client writes, it computes the hash of
the value and its corresponding timestamp and attaches such fingerprint to the message.
In such way (as for P) when servers acknowledge a write, they send back the correct
fingerprint to all clients. Having such information, all clients are potentially able to de-
tect locally if values collected during a read operation are never written values (this
can be simply done by computing the hash of the message and compare it with the one
received during the last write). However, as in the case of Pcv , this detection has a cost
and, to get θ ≥ 12 it is sufficient that this is done with a certain probability. Thus, when a
reader does not collect the same value from all servers, it flips a coin and if the outcome
is 1 then it computes the hash of the messages it delivered and compares them with
the hashes it knows to be associated to a specific timestamp. The introduction of this
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Fig. 5. Qualitative analysis of protocols with respect to their message complexity (left figure) and
computational complexity (right figure). For the message complexity we consider a system where
the number of servers is n = 10 and the number of clients is c = 1000. For the computational
complexity we consider the cost with respect to the message size m.
step is enough to get θ = 12 and to prevent rational servers deviating from the protocol.
Notice that, as for Pcv , the employment of the random coin has a twofold purpose: (i)
to provide a solution for Ds ≥ Gs, for which it is enough to have θ ≥ 12 and (ii) to
avoid to always perform the costly detection operation.
Due to the lack of space, proofs for the correctness of Pcv and Phash protocols are
sketched in the [9].
Trade offs. Figure 5 shows a qualitative comparison of the three proposed protocols
in terms of message complexity and computational cost. In particular, we compare the
cost of the protocols both in presence and absence of a server attack (i.e., when the de-
tection is necessary or not). As we can see, P requires the highest number of messages
and such number does not depend on the real need of doing detection but it is rather re-
quired to mask the type of operation that a client is doing and to make indistinguishable
real read messages from dummy ones. Concerning its computational cost, it is constant
since it does not depend on the message size.
In Pcv it is possible to save the dummy read messages as we do not need anymore
to mask the message pattern but we need to pay the cost of the collaborative detec-
tion, if it is needed. In fact, if a reader is not able to decide a value, it needs to send
messages to contact all the other clients (higher message complexity in case of server
misbehaviour). Concerning the computational cost, it is not affected by the detection.
Conversely, Phash exhibits the dual behaviour: message complexity is not affected by
server misbehaviour but the computational cost is impacted by the need of detection.
Thus, we can conclude saying thatP is a pessimistic protocol and is the most expen-
sive one but it allows to maintains clients and servers completely decoupled. Contrarily,
Pcv and Phash are optimistic as they perform lightweight operations and, if needed,
they perform an heavy detection (with a high message cost in the case of Pcv and a
high computational cost in case of Phash).
8 Conclusion
This paper addresses the problem of building a regular register in a distributed system
where clients are anonymous and servers maintaining the register state may be rational
malicious processes. We have modelled our problem as a two-parties Bayesian game
and we designed distributed protocols able to reach the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and
to emulate a regular register when the loss in case of detection is greater than the gain
obtained from the deviation (i.e.Ds > Gs). To the best of our knowledge, our protocols
are the first register protocols working in the absence of knowledge on the number of
compromised replicas.
The protocols rely on the following assumptions: (i) rational malicious servers act
independently and do not form a coalition, (ii) the system is synchronous, (iii) clients
are anonymous and (iv) write operations are serialised.
As future works, we are investigating how to solve the same problem under weaker
synchrony assumption or in the case an attacker controls a coalition of processes. Ad-
dressing these points is actually far from be trivial. Considering a fully asynchronous
system, in fact, makes impossible to use our punishment mechanism as clients are not
able to distinguish alive but silent servers from those crashed. Additionally, when the
attacker is able to compromise and control a coalition of processes, the model provided
in this paper is no more adeguate and we are studying if and how it is possible to define
a Bayesian Coalitional Game [13] for our problem and if an equilibrium can be reached
in this case.
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